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BARGAINING FOR TAKINGS COMPENSATION
Abraham Bell∗ and Gideon Parchomovsky**

ABSTRACT
Efficiency and fairness require paying full compensation
to property owners when their property is taken by eminent
domain. Yet, current law requires condemnees to settle for
fair market value. Courts and commentators acknowledge
the inadequacy of this state of affairs, but defend it on
practical grounds — there is no way to measure the full
subjective value of property to its owner. Subjective value is
neither observable nor verifiable; consequently, courts
cannot rely upon owners’ reports of the value they attach to
their properties, and must rely instead, upon a suboptimal
compensation regime. To date, the challenge of screening
truthful from exaggerated evaluation has proved
insurmountable.
This Article proposes a strikingly simple solution to the
undercompensation conundrum. It offers a novel selfassessment mechanism that can make full compensation at
subjective value practical by inducing potential condemnees
to report accurately. Under our proposal, property owners
must be given the opportunity to state the value of the
property designated for condemnation. Once property
owners name their price, the government can take the
∗
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University, Faculty of Law.
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Professor, University of Pennsylvania Law School; Visiting Professor, Bar Ilan
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assistance provided by Geoffrey Bauer.
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property only at that price. However, if the government
chooses not to take and pay, the property will become subject
to two restrictions. First, for seventy years, the property
cannot be sold for less than the self-assessed price. If the
property is transferred for less than that price, the owner will
have to pay the shortfall to the government. Second, the selfassessed price – discounted to take account of the
peculiarities of property tax assessments – will become the
benchmark for the owner’s property tax liability. These dual
burdens of partial inalienability and enhanced tax liability
will induce honest reporting by owners, while reducing the
transaction costs created by the compensation process. The
Article sketches several refinements of and limitations on this
mechanism in order to improve its accuracy and prevent both
the government and property owners from abusing it.
We demonstrate that, properly used, our self-assessment
mechanism can dramatically enhance the efficiency and
fairness of eminent domain proceedings, and may even be
extended to regulatory takings.
JEL classifications: H29, K10, K11, K41
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INTRODUCTION
Eminent domain is a controversial prerogative.
The
government’s power to take property upon payment of “just
compensation” undermines property rights that are considered
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inviolable in other contexts. As a consequence, an increasingly large
number of legal controversies and voluminous scholarly literature
concern such questions as how much “public use” is necessary to
justify a taking,1 and when government actions bearing the label
“regulation” are, in fact, regulatory takings for which compensation
must be paid.2
Surprisingly, much less attention has been paid lately to the
equally important issues of the amount of compensation that should
be paid to condemnees and whether current doctrine actually
guarantees “just” compensation.3 Theorists and practitioners have
long recognized two flaws in the compensation mechanism under
current law. First, although the constitutional requirement of “just
compensation” theoretically requires the payment of compensation for
the full value of property to the owner,4 in practice, current law
requires payment of compensation at the market value of the property
taken, rather than the true reserve price of the aggrieved owner.5
Thus, takings law provides inadequate compensation to owners whose
reserve value exceeds market price. Second, current compensation
practices give rise to high litigation and other transaction costs.
Undercompensation is ubiquitous. Indeed, many important
compensation doctrines require courts specifically to ignore many
kinds of value lost to owners of taken property, such as consequential
damages6 and goodwill.7 Courts have adopted restrictive rules such
1

See generally Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L.
REV. 61 (1986); James E. Krier & Christopher Serkin, Public Ruses, Symposium:
The Death of Poletown: the Future of Eminent Domain and Urban Development
After County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 859, 866 (2004); Jed
Rubenfeld, Usings, 102 YALE L.J. 1077 (1993); Lee Anne Fennell, Taking Eminent
Domain Apart, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 957.
2
See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Givings, 111 YALE L.J. 547 (2001);
Abraham Bell, Not Just Compensation,13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 29 (2003)
3
Cf. Christopher Serkin, The Meaning of Value: Assessing Just Compensation for
Regulatory Takings, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 677 (2005) (identifying valuation
mechanisms for just compensation).
4
For discussion, see Part I.C., infra.
5
See, e.g., Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 5 (1949) ("[L]oss to
the owner of nontransferable values deriving from his unique need for property or
idiosyncratic attachment to it, like loss due to an exercise of the police power, is
properly treated as part of the burden of common citizenship."); United States v.
Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374 (1943) (explaining that, for practical reasons, "courts
early adopted, and have retained, the concept of fair market value" in determining
takings compensation); Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934) (stating
that just compensation "does not exceed market value fairly determined").
6
See infra Part I.C.1.
7
See infra Part I.C.1.
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as the fair market value standard “[b]ecause of serious practical
difficulties in assessing the worth an individual places on particular
property at a given time.”8 Subjective value is neither observable nor
readily ascertainable.
If the constitutional standard for “just
compensation” required payment at full subjective value, property
owners would no doubt exaggerate their self-estimations of the value
they place on property and courts would have no reasonable means
for reviewing the accuracy of these reports.9
The problem of inadequate compensation has not gone unnoticed
by courts. Judge Posner wrote in Coniston Corp. v. Village of
Hoffman Estates10:
Compensation in the constitutional sense is [] not full
compensation, for market value is not the value that every
owner of property attaches to his property but merely the
value that the marginal owner attaches to his property. Many
owners are “intramarginal” meaning that because of
relocation costs, sentimental attachments, or the special
suitability of the property for those particular (perhaps
idiosyncratic) needs, they value their property at more than
its market value….
The inefficiency of the current compensation regime is
exacerbated by the high litigation and other transaction costs to which
it gives rise. Even with the concession to fair market value as the
measuring stick, the current compensation mechanism generates high
costs, and considerable efficiency losses.11 Indeed, recognition of this
fact has led some scholars to propose that compensation not be paid
for certain small takings,12 and other to doubt the wisdom of eminent
domain power altogether.13 Observers have pointed to multiple cases
in which the strategic use of such costs may permit the government
taker to “low-ball” compensation offers.14 According to media
reports, property owners who take the government to court routinely
receive much higher compensation awards—often by hundreds of
8

United States v. 564.43 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 511 (1979).
See Lee Anne Fennell, Revealing Options, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1399, 1404 (2005)
(noting the problem of false valuation statements).
10
844 F.2d 461, 464 (7th Cir. 1988).
11
See Patricia Munch, An Economic Analysis of Eminent Domain, 84 J. POL.
ECON. 473 (1976), Michael A. Heller & James E. Krier, Deterrence and Distribution
in the Law of Takings, 112 HARV. L. REV. 997 (1999)
12
See Heller & Krier, supra note 11.
13
See Munch, supra note 11.
14
See, e.g., Dan Browning, MnDOT’s Tactics Squeeze Landowners, MINNEAPOLIS
STAR
TRIBUNE,
Sept.
21,
2003,
available
at
http://www.startribune.com/stories/462/4109734.html.
9
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percent—than their peers who elected to settle for the government’s
initial offer. Yet, the higher compensation can only be secured after
expensive legal battles.
Importantly, it is difficult to devise a compensation mechanism
that would address both problems simultaneously. The more we
invest in determining the condemnee’s subjective value, the costlier
the compensation process. Conversely, compromising the accuracy
of the compensation mechanism by eschewing payment for such
items as goodwill lowers the cost of the process but only at the price
of greater undercompensation of subjective value.15
Undercompensation raises both fairness and efficiency concerns.
First, it deprives property owners of part of the value of the property
taken. Because the fairness rationale for takings’ compensation posits
that it is wrong to force an individual to bear the costs of benefiting
society, an award that falls short of full compensation potentially
wrongs the condemnee.16 Second, undercompensation poses the risk
of excessive takings. Government decisionmakers are often thought
to be subject to fiscal illusion, meaning that they operate under the
misapprehension that actions that impose no cost on the government
budget are, in fact, costless.17 Under this theory, when it takes
without compensating the owner for the full loss occasioned by the
taking, the government takes too much.18
In this Article, we introduce a strikingly simple bargaining
mechanism that can dramatically reduce the scope of both problems
and importantly does it at a very small cost. At the core of our model
lies a self-assessment apparatus that is designed to induce potential
condemnees to report accurately the subjective value they place on
the property to be taken. Once the property owners name their price,
the government can take the property only at that price. However, if
the government chooses not to take and pay, the property will become
subject to two restrictions. First, for seventy years, the property
cannot be sold for less than the self-assessed price. If the property is
transferred for less than that price, the owner will have to pay the
shortfall to the government.19 Second, the self-assessed price will
become the benchmark for the owner’s property tax liability. As we
15

By contrast to market value, special subjective value is presumed to be zero
absent evidence indicating otherwise.
See infra Part I.A.
17
See infra Part I.B.
18
See infra Part I.B..
19
We thank William Fischel for helping us think through this element of our
proposed mechanism. Any flaws in the mechanism, of course, are solely our
responsibility.
16
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will show, the dual burdens of partial inalienability and enhanced tax
liability should suffice to keep the owner honest in reporting her
subjective value.
The self-assessment mechanism provides more accurate
compensation for subjective value, while dramatically reducing
transaction costs created by the compensatory process. Since owners
name their price, they will state a value that is no less than their
subjective value, as there is no reason for them to voluntarily part
with their property for less than the full subjective value. However,
owners will not state a price greater than the subjective value, lest
they subject themselves to excessive tax liability and limitations on
alienation.20 Moreover, the mechanism is self-policing and therefore
should reduce the costs of assessing and litigating property valuations.
By relieving both sides of the need to hire expert assessors and legal
counsel and to engage in extensive evidence-collection, our proposal
significantly lowers the transaction costs associated with
compensation.
A potential peril arising under our model is that it may induce the
government to exercise its eminent domain power excessively simply
to boost its tax revenues. To alleviate this concern, we complement
the basic model with a “decoupling” mechanism that severs the
amount paid by the owner for high self-assessed valuations from the
amount collected by the government. While the owner will pay based
upon her self-assessment, the decoupling mechanism will prevent the
government from collecting the higher tax. Instead, taxes on the
increment between the value of the property based on tax assessment
rolls and the self-assessed value will be payable to recognized
charities of the owner’s choice.
For example, imagine that the city of Chicago declares its desire
to use its power of eminent domain to seize realty owned by Joni Olin
for the purpose of building a public university. The realty – a plot
known as Blackacre – currently has an assessed value of $200,000 on
the city property tax rolls, and a market value of $300,000.21
20

As we discuss at length in Part II, infra, we do not propose a first-best
mechanism, and cannot precisely calibrate incentives so as to ensure that all selfassessed values will be identical to subjective value. However, for reasons that we
explain infra, our mechanism should push owners toward a self-assessment of
subjective value.
21
Perhaps the most famous example of the unmooring of assessed value from
market value in property tax assessment may be found in California’s Proposition
13 passed in 1978. In addition to freezing assessed property values to 1975 levels,
Proposition 13 capped property tax rates at one percent of assessed value, and
limited reassessment rates to two percent per year. See PROPERTY TAXATION AND
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However, Ms. Olin values Blackacre at $400,000, and she so declares
its value for the purposes of the taking. If the city of Chicago
abandons its plan to seize Blackacre, Ms. Olin’s freedoms with
respect to the property will be restricted in two significant ways.
First, she will not be able to sell Blackacre for less than $400,000
unless she pays the City of Chicago the difference between this
amount and the eventual sale price. Hence, if she sells Blackacre at
less than $400,000, she will have to make up any shortfall by making
a payment to the city of Chicago. For instance, if she sells Blackacre
to Frieda Ford for $310,000 one year later, Ms. Olin will have to pay
$90,000 to the city of Chicago. Second, Ms. Olin will have to pay
higher taxes on Blackacre for so long as she holds the property. For
purposes of simplifying this example, we assume that the taxes will
be paid on nominal values.22 Thus, Ms. Olin will receive a tax bill
based upon the self-assessed value of $400,000 rather than the former
tax roll assessment of $200,000. Half of Ms. Olin’s tax bill will be
paid to the municipality (in accordance with the $200,000 originally
on the tax roll). The other half (representing the difference between
the $400,000 declared value and the original $200,000) will be paid to
Ms. Olin’s charity of choice – naturally, the Federalist Society.
As the example shows, small adjustments to the self-assessment
mechanism may be necessary in order for it to remain effective over
time. In our example, we have overlooked the effects of inflation,
shocks to the housing markets, and other factors that may require
updating the self-assessed price. In the main, we suggest that these
factors can be dealt with by pegging the self-assessed price to an
appropriate local housing price index. The index would adjust prices
both upward and downward, so that homeowners would not be unduly
punished for downturns in the market, or unduly rewarded for upticks.
Thus, in our example, if during the year following the selfassessment, the local housing price index goes up by 6%, the selfassessed value would similarly be increased by 6%, i.e., from
$400,000 to $424,000. Naturally, the index would have to be one
measuring similar prices for similar assets in similar locations, in
order to truly reflect the market changes on the self-assessed value.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCE 180 ((Wallace E. Oates ed., 2001). For discussion
of the mechanisms of tax assessment in Illinois, including Cook County, see Nina
H. Tamburo, The Illinois Property Tax System: An Overview, 10 LOY. CONSUMER
L. REV. 186 (1998).
22
Our mechanism actually discounts the additional tax burden in order to take
account of the gap between assessed and market value. For further discussion, see
infra Part II.
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More importantly, in order to reduce possible distortions
introduced by the property tax liability, relative, rather than nominal
values should be used. We introduce a mechanism that adjusts tax
liabilities to government assessment practices later in the text.23
Our proposed mechanism constitutes yet another contribution to
the burgeoning law and economics literature on self-assessment. This
line of inquiry originated in Saul Levmore’s classic article on the
possibility of using self-assessment as a mechanism for setting
property tax rates.24 Several years ago, we proposed a selfassessment mechanism for measuring the third party effects of
governmental takings—a phenomenon we called “derivative
takings.”25 Recently, Lee Anne Fennell suggested the utility of selfpriced options in a variety of property contexts such as nuisance
control and conservation easements.26 As we discuss later, while
Levmore’s mechanism was designed to resolve a different problem
(undervaluation of properties for property taxes) than ours
(undervaluation of properties for takings compensation), our
mechanism owes a heavy intellectual debt to Levmore’s work, as well
as others examining self-assessment. To date, however, no one has
attempted to devise a self-assessment mechanism capable of tackling
the nettlesome challenge of ordinary eminent domain compensation,
which continues to be the classic example of the limits of selfassessment.27 It is this void that this Article attempts to fill.
The Article unfolds in four parts. In Part I, we review the
reigning theories of compensation and demonstrate why they mandate
full and “just” compensation for government takings. This Part
examines the theoretical and practical flaws with market-based
valuation for takings compensation, and pays particular attention to
empirical data verifying the phenomenon of systematic
undercompensation. Part II presents our proposal for declaring
subjective value. Here we explain the mechanism, and compare it to
other proposals for correcting undercompensation, as well as similar
self-assessed pricing mechanisms.
Part III explores potential
drawbacks and limitations, and compares our proposal to alternatives.
A brief conclusion follows.
23

See infra Part II.
Saul Levmore, Self-Assessed Valuation Systems for Tort and Other Law, 68 VA.
L. REV. 771 (1982).
25
Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Takings Reassessed, 87 VA. L. REV. 271
(2001).
26
See Fennell, supra note 9.
27
See Fennell, supra note 9, at 1419 (invoking eminent domain compensation as a
case where self-reporting will fail).
24

SSRN WORKING PAPER

© 2005, Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky

BARGAINING FOR TAKINGS COMPENSATION

9/16/2005 2:09 PM

10

I. WHY JUST COMPENSATION
Eminent domain has long been accepted as an indispensable
feature of the sovereign powers of government. However, the
immense scope of the government’s power to take is not without
constitutional limits. The Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution
enumerates two independent prerequisites to the exercise of eminent
domain. First, the government may only take private property for
“public use.” Second, the government must always pay “just
compensation” in exchange for the taken property.
In practice, the just compensation requirement has proved to be
far more important than the public use limitation. As the Supreme
Court reaffirmed most recently in Kelo v. City of New London,28
under federal constitutional law, virtually any governmental action
that is otherwise permitted by constitution law will satisfy the public
use requirement. Notwithstanding a handful of notable exceptions,29
federal constitutional law recognizes the states’ plenary powers to act
in the interests of public health, safety, morals or general welfare.30
The states’ powers in this regard – generally labeled “police
powers”31 – permit the undertaking of such diverse actions as the
confiscation and redistribution of private land holdings,32 and the
imposition of comprehensive zoning plans that severely limit the
ability to build upon and develop real estate holdings.33 Importantly,
in Hawaii v. Midkiff, the Supreme Court held that “[t]he “public use”
requirement [of the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause] is []
coterminous with the scope of a sovereign’s police powers.”34 Thus,
it is difficult to conceive of a state action against private property that
would lack constitutional justification as being in service of a public
use.35 Federal constitutional law has effectively eliminated the public
use limitation on eminent domain.36

28

125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005).
Perhaps the most prominent exception is the dormant commerce clause, which
prevents states from regulating interstate commercial activities. See, e.g., Cooley v.
Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
30
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926).
31
See Randy E. Barnett, The Proper Scope of the Police Power, 79 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 429 (2004).
32
Hawaii v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
33
See Euclid, 272 U.S. at 379.
34
See Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 240.
35
The police power is the state’s regulatory power. D. Benjamin Barros, The Police
Power and the Takings Clause, 58 U. MIAMA L. REV. 471 (2004). The courts grant
nearly unlimited discretion to the state’s regulation of economic affairs. RONALD
29

SSRN WORKING PAPER

© 2005, Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky

BARGAINING FOR TAKINGS COMPENSATION

9/16/2005 2:09 PM

11

Given the limited importance of the “public use” clause, the just
compensation requirement remains the only meaningful constitutional
safeguard against unlimited use of the eminent domain power. Not
surprisingly, the duty to pay just compensation has been analyzed by
numerous scholars, and a number of competing theories have been
proposed to explain its purpose and scope. Following convention, we
divide these theories into two major groupings: fairness-based
justifications and efficiency-based justifications.
A. Fairness-Based Justifications
The Supreme Court announced a fairness-based justification for
the compensation requirement in Armstrong v. United States.37 Per
Justice Black, “[t]he Fifth Amendment’s [just compensation]
guarantee … was designed to bar Government from forcing some
people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice,
should be borne by the public as a whole.”38 Unfortunately, the Court
refrained from elaborating the means by which such fairness could be
determined.
Into this void stepped Frank Michelman.39 Drawing heavily on
the work of John Rawls, Michelman suggested that the fair
compensation requirement represents the legal regime that the
citizenry would have chosen behind a veil of ignorance. Specifically,
Michelman argued that the scope of the just compensation
requirement is that which the citizenry would choose if it knew of a
governmental power of eminent domain in the abstract but did not
know how the burden of exercising that power would be distributed
among the general public.
Essentially, Michelman assumed that if people had no knowledge
of what their future property holdings would be, they would
ROTUNDA AND JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON
AND PROCEDURE § 15.4 (3d ed. 1986).
36

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SUBSTANCE

In state law, public use requirements continue to have some significance. For
example, in County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 471 Mich. 415, 684 N. W. 2d 765
(2004), the Supreme Court of Michigan ruled that the use of eminent domain when
private parties ultimately acquire the property is permissible only when: (1) there
exists a “public necessity of the extreme sort” (highways, railroads, etc.); (2) the
public retains continuing oversight authority over the use of the land; or (3) the
property is selected based on “facts of independent public significance.” See also
Merrill, supra note 1.
37
364 U.S. 40 (1960).
38
Id. at 49.
39
Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967).
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nevertheless have a shared notion of an acceptable risk of exposure to
eminent domain. Since Michelman developed his view before the
important Supreme Court decision in Penn Central v. City of New
York,40 it is difficult precisely to map his view onto current doctrine.41
However, it is clear that Michelman believed that citizens would be
willing to accept some risk of eminent domain – that is, Michelman’s
citizenry would not require compensation for every taking. Just as
clearly, Michelman believed that citizens would not be willing to
leave their property fully exposed to government taking.
Michelman’s framework heavily relies on John Rawls’ Justice as
Fairness.42 Rawls sought to uncover the terms of the hypothetical
“social contract” at which rational, self-regarding and interdependent
individuals would arrive behind “a veil of ignorance.”43 Rawls
further assumed that the actors behind the veil of ignorance have
information about the basic structure of society but lack knowledge
about their personal traits and status in the real world.44 Rawls
postulated that his thought experiment yields two principles for
designing social institutions. The first principle entitles each
individual to the maximum liberty compatible with the exercise of a
like liberty by others.45 The second principle (widely known as the
“difference principle”) sanctions deviations from the first principle so
long as the positions subject to the differential treatment are open to
everyone, and the unequal treatment yields the greatest advantage for
the least well off members of the group.46
Applying the two principles in the takings context, Michelman
posited that the first prohibits “all efficiency-motivated social
undertakings, which have the prima facie effect of impairing
‘liberties’ unequally, unless corrective measures (compensation

40

438 U.S. 104 (1978).
Some of Michelman’s analysis appears to have been incorporated in part by the
Penn Central court. Id. at 128.
42
67 PHIL. REV. 164 (1958). John Rawls further elaborate his theory at book-length.
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
43
Id. at 136-42.
44
Id. .
45
Id. at 60-65.
46
Id. George Klosko notes that “[t]here are differences in Rawls's presentation of
the principles between ‘Justice as Fairness’ and later works. In particular, the
second principle in ‘Justice as Fairness’ is stated in terms of the advantage of
everyone, rather than the least advantaged.” George Klosko, Rawls’s Argument
From Political Stability, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1882, 1882 n.4 (1994). It bears
emphasis that Michelman’s article predated the publication of A THEORY OF
JUSTICE, and therefore relied on “Justice As Fairness.”
41
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payments) are employed to equalize impacts.”47 The second,
however, justifies departures from the rule of full compensation “if it
could be shown that some other rule should be expected to work out
best for each person insofar as his interests are affected by the social
undertakings giving rise to occasions of compensation.”48 Under
what circumstances, then, would a “less-than-full-compensation” be
fair? In answering this question, Michelman first identified the key
parameters that affect the analysis. The first parameter – “settlement
costs” – denotes the cost of calculating and paying compensation to
aggrieved owners.49
The second – “demoralization costs” –
represents the psychological harm incomplete compensation
occasions on condemnees and their sympathizers, and the forgone
investment in property across the board that stems from the fear of
undercompensatory takings.50
A stringent compensation regime invariably entails high
settlement costs that would occasionally thwart welfare enhancing
projects. Hence, such a regime will in some cases leave everyone
worse off, including the least advantageous members of our society.
A lax compensation regime, by contrast, will allow efficient
developments projects to proceed but only at the cost of imposing a
disproportionate portion of the cost on certain members of our
society. Hence, a lax compensation regime may generate high
demoralization costs. Michelman suggested that compensation
should be paid when settlement costs are low, the gains from the
government action are dubious and “the harm concentrated on one
individual is unusually great.”51 On the other hand, compensation
may be denied when property owners who are burdened by the
government action also benefit from it or when the burden falls on the
shoulders of many people.52 Although it does not explicitly say this,
subsequent commentators interpreted Michelman’s analysis as
suggesting that government pay compensation when demoralization
costs exceed settlement costs but not otherwise.53
At the end of the day, Michelman’s position appears to be that
while not all takings (broadly defined) require the payment of
compensation, in those cases where compensation ought to be paid, it
must be paid in full. Michelman’s analysis strikes a balance among
47

Michelman, supra note 39, at 1221.
Id.
49
Id. at 1214.
50
Id.
51
Id. at 1223.
52
Id.
53
DAVID A. DANA & THOMAS W. MERRILL, PROPERTY TAKINGS 36 (2002).
48

SSRN WORKING PAPER

© 2005, Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky

BARGAINING FOR TAKINGS COMPENSATION

9/16/2005 2:09 PM

14

the competing interest implicated in takings law by exempting the
government from the duty to compensate for many acts that adversely
affect property value. But in instances when the duty to compensate
does arise, property owners should be fully compensated for their
losses. The payment of less than full compensation in such cases
would seem to violate the demands of fairness.54
Margaret Radin developed an alternative framework for
evaluating the fairness of takings compensation.55 Radin based her
analysis on her understanding of Freidrich Hegel’s personhood
theory. Hegel’s work highlighted the link between property and the
self. To Hegel, property constituted the mechanism by which humans
achieve self-actualization. He believed that the human will required
material objects to manifest itself and that without them individual
freedom could not exist.56 Building on Hegel’s theory, Radin
introduced an important distinction between personal and fungible
property.57 She divided the world of objects into two categories:
nonfungible and fungible.58 Nonfungible goods, such as a wedding
ring or family home are constitutive of their owners' personality and
hence create special value for their owners above and beyond market
value.59 Fungible objects, by contrast, lack uniqueness and serve no
purpose in constituting the self.60 Radin argued that property law
should respect the distinction between fungible and nonfungible
goods and treat the two differentially.61
Accordingly, Radin argued that compensation at market value
would often not suffice for the needs of justice. She proposed that
owners have the right to injunctive relief, or property rule protection,
in cases involving nonfungible goods, while compensatory damages,
54

It should be noted that Hanoch Dagan advances a different interpretation of
Michelman. Working from a distributive justice perspective but relying heavily on
Michelman, Dagan proposes that takings compensation be used a means of wealth
redistribution. Specifically, he argues that compensation amounts should be
adjusted to the recipient’s wealth. On Dagan’s proposal, poor condemnees will be
entitled to a compensation award greater than the market value of their property,
whereas affluent condemnees will receive less than market value. See Hanoch
Dagan, Takings and Distributive Justice, 85 VA. L. REV. 741 (1999). For criticism,
see Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Takings, Efficiency, and Distributive Justice: A Response
to Professor Dagan, 99 MICH. L. REV. 157 (2000).
55
Margaret J. Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982).
56
GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT ¶¶39-45 (T. M. Knox
trans. 1967) (1821).
57
Radin, supra note 55.
58
Id. at 960.
59
Id.
60
Id. at 986.
61
Id.
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or liability rule protection, would be applied to all other cases.62
Radin explicitly noted that the personality theory would support
extending property rule protection to “a special class of property like
a family home.63 And elsewhere, she wrote that compensation at
market value “seem[s] quite wrong in cases where property interests
are apprehended as personal and incommensurate with money”;64 in
such cases paying market value would be insufficient. Hence, the
personality theory also rejects compensation at fair market for family
homes and other personality laden assets and supports substituting the
existing compensation measure for a higher award, or in some cases, a
complete ban on the taking.
B. Efficiency-Based Justifications
Efficiency-based justifications for takings compensation are both
numerous and controversial. All such justifications hold as a premise
that governmental decisions to take property cannot be held ex ante to
be efficient. As Louis Kaplow has argued, if the government is
presumed always to act efficiently, takings compensation is counterproductive because it creates moral hazard; i.e., it encourages owners
to build too much, without taking account of the likelihood of
government takings.65 However, once the possibility of inefficient
governmental decisionmaking is acknowledged, just compensation
plays an important role in encouraging efficient takings.
1.

Fiscal Illusion

The most prominent efficiency-based explanation for
compensation references fiscal illusion. Fiscal illusion is the
presumed habit of government decisionmakers of ignoring costs that
do not directly affect government inflows and outflows. When
operating under fiscal illusion, a state actor ignores any costs of her
action to private property owners resulting from takings, aside from
62

See id. at 988 (“[T]here would be a nice simplicity in hypothesizing that personal
property should be protected by property rules and that fungible property should be
protected by liability rules.”).
63
Id. at 1005-06. In the alternative, she noted that such a limitation has not
developed.
64
MARGARET JANE RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY 154 (1993). Radin further
notes that “In such cases it may be difficult to decide whether compensatory justice
requires higher compensation or whether no compensation should be paid because
the problem is outside the scope of compensatory justice." Id.
65
Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV.
509, 614-17 (1986). See also, Lawrence Blume & Perry Shapiro, Compensation for
Takings: An Economic Analysis, 72 CAL. L. REV. 569 (1984).
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those that appear in the budget (such as lower tax yields). Thus,
government actors suffering from fiscal illusion see most of the
benefits engendered by uncompensated takings, but few of the costs.
Takings without compensation enhance the government coffers by
adding property holdings without significant cost.66 However, when
compensation is not paid, most costs are borne by the private property
owners. Consequently, if government could take without paying
compensation, it would take too much.
The constitutional requirement of just compensation fixes the
problem by forcing the government to include private costs in
government budgets. Once the budget fully reflects social costs and
benefits, fiscal illusion no longer distorts the decisionmaking process.
This can be seen by way of example. Imagine that the state is
considering condemning land, currently used for various industrial
purposes, in order to build a toll road. The road will produce benefits
to the public of $10 million, of which the state will recapture the full
amount in tolls. Construction costs for the road are $8 million. In
private hands, the land produces $9 million for the industrial owners;
consequently, the land is worth $9 million on the open market. By
efficiency criteria, the state should not build the road. The road
produces only $10 million in benefits, but costs $17 million (i.e., $8
million in construction costs, and $9 million in lost industrial output).
However, that is not how the transaction is viewed by a state actor
that suffers from fiscal illusion. If the state operates under fiscal
illusion, and need not pay takings compensation, it will build the road,
because the road produces $10 million of benefits for the state budget,
at a cost of only $8 million on-budget. Mandating takings
compensation overcomes this problem by forcing the state to take
account of the full measure of costs engendered by the project. The
fiscal illusion-afflicted state that must pay compensation will take
account of $10 million in benefits and $17 million in costs, and make
the efficient decision not to produce the road.
To fully overcome the distorting effects of fiscal illusion, takings
law must mandate full compensation for losses suffered by the owners
of the taken property. If the government need pay only for market
value, but not for idiosyncratic or subjective value, the theory of fiscal
illusion posits that the government will take too much, since it will
ignore subjective and idiosyncratic value destroyed by the taking.

66

The important costs for uncompensated takings are administrative costs, and the
lost tax revenue from the now-public property.
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This can be seen by revising our earlier example. Imagine that
the road described above is designated to pass through a private
residential area, rather than an industrial area. Once again, anticipated
benefits from the road are $10 million, all of which will be recovered
by the state through tolls. And, again, construction will cost $8
million. Market price of the residential properties is $1.5 million.
However, resident families have lived in the area for generations, and
have developed such great sentimental attachment to their homes that
they would only sell them at twice the market price, i.e., $3 million.
If the government need only pay market value compensation, it will
make the inefficient decision to build the road, since it will take
account of only $9.5 million in costs against $10 million in benefits.
However, if the government must pay full compensation at the value
of the property to its current owners, it will make the efficient
decision not to build the road, since there is only a $10 million from
construction, at a total cost of $12 million.
To be sure, fiscal illusion provides only a partial explanation for
the current state of compensation law. Taken to its logical
conclusion, the fiscal illusion justification calls for a much more
vigorous compensation policy than that currently employed. As we
noted in a previous essay, many of the costs occasioned by
government takings are indirect, falling upon third parties who suffer
losses due to government acts even though their property is not taken
directly. Thus, the theory of fiscal illusion calls for full compensation
for derivative takings.67 By the same token, there is no reason to
suspect that fiscal illusion afflicts only decisions to effectuate the
power of eminent domain (i.e., physical takings). While not
subscribing to a theory based upon fiscal illusion, Richard Epstein has
observed that government actions affecting private property and
wealth are ubiquitous, and certainly extend far beyond traditional
exercises of eminent domain.68 To address concerns of fiscal illusion,
the compensation requirement for takings would have to extend to
many government actions well beyond ordinary physical and
regulatory takings. Moreover, as we wrote in a previous article, since
many of the benefits of government takings find no expression in the
governmental budget, a theory of fiscal illusion calls for the
assessment of charges for benefits conferred by government givings.69

67

Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 25.
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY
EMINENT DOMAIN 10 (1985).
69
Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 2, at 585.
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None of this, however, suggests that full compensation should not
be offered. The gaps in treating the effects of fiscal illusion merely
suggest that there are many cases in which takings law is deficient in
failing to pay compensation or assess charges. None of the gaps
suggests that partial compensation is a preferable rule. On the
contrary, absent a more cost-effective means for ensuring efficient
takings decisions by the government, the best means for combating
fiscal illusion is requiring that the government fully internalize the
costs of takings.
2.

Moral Hazard

The economic case for the payment of compensation in order to
combat fiscal illusion has been countered by commentators argue that
economic analysis actually requires not paying any compensation in
order to avoid creating moral hazard. Theories of moral hazard posit
that where the government insures individuals against economic loss
resulting from some kinds of harm, the government incentivizes
individuals to engage in excessively risky activities. For example,
where the government provides disaster relief funds for properties that
are destroyed by floods, it incentivizes private homeowners to build
too may houses in flood plains, as they need not take full account of
the risk that floods will destroy the homes. Moral hazard arises
whenever that the insured actor has the ability to prevent or mitigate
the harm by any means, including refraining from engaging in the
activity altogether.
In the context of takings compensation, theories of moral hazard
suggest that full recompense distorts property owners’ incentives.
Property owners may over-develop property at risk of government
taking, knowing that they will receive compensation for any taking.
On the one hand, the owners know that they will enjoy the full upside
of any increased value resulting from the development if there is no
taking. On the other hand, the owners do not have to worry about
recouping development costs if the government seizes the property,
because the government will have to pay compensation for the value
of the property as developed.
To alleviate the moral hazard created by takings compensation,
some commentators have argued for either no compensation, or
reduced compensation for takings. Louis Kaplow, incorporating an
analysis of eminent domain into a larger study of “transitions” –
government policy changes that impose gains and losses on private
actors – opined that the optimal amount of takings compensation is
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none.70 A similar result was reached by Lawrence Blume, Daniel
Rubenfeld and Perry Shapiro, in circumstances where the decision to
take is independent of the use to which the property is put.71 Both
studies assumed that government policies are made efficiently and are
not affected by fiscal illusion.72
However, once these unrealistic assumptions are relaxed, the nocompensation recommendation can no longer be sustained. Blume,
Rubenfeld and Shapiro explicitly recognized that a government that is
susceptible to fiscal illusion would make inefficient decisions unless it
paid full compensation.73 In other words, any policy of less than full
compensation at subjective value (except for the value of inefficient
development) will fail to incentivize the government properly.
The problem – a familiar one in such fields as torts and contracts
– is how the law can simultaneously incentivize opposing parties who
can each mitigate harm. In takings cases, full compensation
incentivizes the government not to take recklessly, but encourages
property owners to develop recklessly. Incomplete compensation
may discourage reckless development, but will lead the government
to take too much. In torts, this problem is resolved by creating a
negligence standard for at least one of the parties. For instance, to
assure that both potential tortfeasors and victims take due care to
mitigate possible harms, tort law will often adopt a rule of
contributory negligence, barring recovery when the victim negligently
contributed to the accident.74 By exposing the tortfeasor to strict
liability or liability based on negligence, and simultaneously barring
recovery for a contributorily negligent victim, the law achieves what

70

See Kaplow, supra note 65, at 614-17 (1986).
Lawrence Blume, Daniel L. Rubinfeld & Perry Shapiro, The Taking of Land:
When Should Compensation Be Paid? 99 Q. J. ECON. 71 (1984). Thomas Miceli
emphasized the flip side of this observation—excessive development may deter
takings where full compensation is required. Thus, a full compensation regime can
ensure optimal land use. Thomas J. Miceli, Compensation for the Taking of Land
Under Eminent Domain, 147 J. INST. & THEOR. ECON. 354 (1991).
72
Kaplow, supra note 65, at 521; Blume, et al., supra note 71, at 81.
73
Blume, et al., supra note 71, at 88.
74
The economic incentive effects of tort law have been widely analyzed. Among
the important works are GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS (1970);
Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972); Prather
Brown, Toward an Economic Theory of Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 323 (1973);
Steven Shavell, Strict Liability versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1980);
STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW (1987).
71
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Robert Cooter calls “double responsibility at the margin,” or optimal
incentives for both parties.75
Elsewhere, one of us has suggested a contributory negligence
standard for takings compensation that would bar recovery for
reckless overdevelopment of property and thereby achieve double
responsibility at the margin.76 Blume, Rubenfeld and Shapiro posited
that this result could be achieved by requiring lump sum
compensation at an amount approximating full value of the property
absent excessive development. In substance, these proposals are
identical, albeit under different terminology.77 Either way, full
compensation leads to the most efficient results, so long as
compensation is not paid for excessive development.
While current law does not bar recovery for excessive
development, the existence of takings blight strongly suggests that
this is not a serious problem.78 Thus, it is difficult to argue that moral
hazard presents a strong argument for less-than-full compensation.
3.

Public Choice and Interest Group Payoffs

A different efficiency justification – based in the arena of
political economy – was advanced Daniel Farber.79 Like Kaplow,
Farber proceeded from an assumption of the efficiency of initial
government decisions to take property by eminent domain. However,
Farber assumed a more complicated political process, modeled on the
insights of public choice theory. In Farber’s model, an initial efficient
proposal to take property for the benefit of society would not be
implemented until approved by a political process ruled by interest
groups. Here, Farber posited, efficient takings would be likely
75

Robert Cooter, Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: The Model of Precaution,
73 CAL. L. REV. 1, 4 (1985).
76
Bell, supra note 2, at 48.
77
Blume, Rubinfeld and Shapiro provocatively write that in an environment of
fiscal illusion coupled with moral hazard, “no compensation is suboptimal, but so is
the payment of full compensation.” Blume, et al, supra note 71, at 88. This
statement is somewhat misleading, as it refers to the inefficiency caused by payment
of full compensation inclusive of all development, including reckless
overdevelopment. In a separate article, Blume and Shapiro more explicitly
suggested that moral hazard could be eliminated by adjusting compensation to
eliminate rewards for inefficient development. Blume & Shapiro, supra note 65, at
619.
78
See infra Part I.C.2.
79
Farber’s article does not rely solely on the public choice/rent-seeking account
presented here; indeed, Farber acknowledged the plausibility of other economic
explanations for the compensation requirement. Daniel A. Farber, Economic
Analysis and Just Compensation, 12 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 125, 137 (1992).
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blocked absent the payment of compensation. This is due to the
probable way government actions based upon eminent domain will
distribute costs and benefits. In Farber’s view, the usual case involves
a small number of affected properties to be taken, with widely spread
public benefits. Thus, the owners of properties designated for taking
will comprise a well-motivated and small interest group, while the
benefiting public will be scattered and poorly motivated (as the
benefits for any individual member of the public will be small).80
Implicitly relying upon Mancur Olson’s theory of the superior
political power of minority interest groups,81 Farber suggested that
absent compensation for government takings, targeted property
owners will systematically foil societally beneficial government
actions in order to block personal loss. Farber argued that
compensation combats the power of this powerful property owner
interest group by paying it off.82 Once targeted property owners are
mollified by compensation payments, they will remove their
objections to socially beneficial projects, and permit them to move
forward.
While Farber does not address the question of how much
compensation must be paid, it seems clear that the anchor should be
full compensation. If targeted property owners are systematically
undercompensated, they will be left with a high incentive to lobby
against beneficial government projects. The lobby will only be safely
neutralized when it is indifferent to the taking, because it has been
fully compensated for the loss occasioned by the taking.
C. The Flaws In Market Compensation
Thus far, we have seen that, whether based in explanations of
fairness or efficiency, theories of takings compensation mandate full
recompense for the taken property at its value to the erstwhile owner.
Yet, there are a number of ways in which compensation at market
value falls short of this goal of full compensation. In this section, we
discuss several types of value excluded from compensation under
current doctrine: subjective value, goodwill and “takings blight.”83
80

Id. at 133-38.
Mancur Olson, Jr., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION AND THE THEORY OF
GROUPS (1965).
82
Farber, supra note 79, at 125 (“Public choice theory suggests that legislators
normally offer compensation to landowners whose property is taken for a project,
because they would form a powerful lobby against the project if not ‘bought off.’”).
83
As we shall explain in greater detail, below…, we use the term “takings blight” to
refer to the difference between the property’s market value prior to the
81
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In addition, we look at the adverse effects of transaction costs,
particularly litigation costs.
1. Subjective Value and Goodwill
For fungible goods with readily available market substitutes there
should be no substantial gap between market value and the subjective
value of the owner. However, many types of property do not share
this characteristic. For example, perfect substitutes for a family home
may rarely be found on the market.84 For one, location, construction
and layouts naturally differ from home to home. In addition, owners
often enjoy additional enjoy from unique experiences and memories
associated with the homestead.85 Consequently, when government
takes residential property it often wipes out substantial subjective
value in excess of market value. Many scholars have recognized the
gap between subjective and market value, albeit occasionally under
different names.86 James Krier and Christopher Serkin, for example,
note that takings law fails to compensate for the gap between
subjective and market values, and label it the consumer surplus.87
In addition, as Margaret Radin noted, the gap between subjective
and market value may be found not only with respect to residential
homes but also in the case of other assets. She uses the example of a
wedding band as the paradigm of personal property for which market
substitute will not do. Of course, takings of personal property such as
wedding bands are so rare by comparison to condemnations of
residential homes that we elect to focus on the latter. At the same
time, it is important to recognize that not every taking of real estate
results in a significant loss of subjective value. For instance, the
taking of a nondescript warehouse in an area where similar
warehouses may be obtained is unlikely to occasion a loss of excess
subjective value.88
government’s announcement of its intent to take, and the subsequent lower value at
the time compensation is actually set. The difference stems is due to the fact that the
announcement in and of itself depresses property values.
84
Many unique variables come together to form a family’s home, and it is difficult
or even impossible to replicate all of them in another perfect substitute available on
the market.
85
The value of stable ownership should be distinguished from the “endowment
effect,” which causes individuals to value goods in their possession more than
identical goods in someone else’s possession. See, e.g., Richard Thaler, Toward a
Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, 1 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 39, 44 (1980).
86
See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 1; 4-12 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 12.01.
87
Krier & Serkin, supra, note 1, at 866 .
88
Of course, warehouses can exhibit some of the same personalized characteristics
as a family home, and so may also exhibit increased subjective value.
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Finally, even without the likelihood of any idiosyncratic value,
sentimental businesses may be harmed by the standard rules of market
value compensation. Businesses often have values as going concerns
above the summed values of their assets. The gap between the value
of the business as a whole and the assets comprising the business is
called “goodwill” and it represents the unique value of the business as
a going concern.89 Many states do not compensate for lost goodwill,90
and, as interpreted by the courts, the constitutional standard of “just
compensation” does not require compensation for this head of
damages.91
2. Takings “Blight”
Generally, compensation is paid for the value of property as of
the day it is actually taken, rather than the day on which the taking
was announced. Not surprisingly, these values may differ greatly.
Businesses will not invest in a new property consequent to the
announcement of a taking, as any the value of any built-up goodwill
will disappear on the day of the taking. Similarly, purchasers of
residential properties looking for a stable long-term home will avoid
the area. As Gideon Kanner has noted, the announcement of a
pending government taking often results in the precipitous decline of
property values in the targeted neighborhood. Many sales are
“distress sales,” while buyers are limited to those interested in short
term uses only.92 This phenomenon, known as “planning blight” or
“condemnation blight,” is the result of the impairment of
marketability caused by the knowledge that any ownership interest in
the property is short-lived.93
While three doctrines of takings compensation have been
proposed to deal with this lost value, none has provided a complete
solution. The first of the three doctrines recognizes the rights of
89

26 AM. JUR. 2d Eminent Domain § 306 (2005).
See, e.g., Michigan State Highway Commission v. Gaffield, 108 Mich. App. 88,
310 N.W.2d 281 (1981); City of Dunkirk v. Conti, 186 A.D.2d 1012, 588 N.Y.S.2d
465 (4th Dep't 1992); State v. Rogers, 772 S.W.2d 559 (Tex. App. Amarillo 1989).
91
See, e.g., U.S. v. 0.88 Acres of Land, 670 F. Supp. 210 (W.D. Mich. 1987); State
v. Ensley, 240 Ind. 472, 164 N.E.2d 342 (1960); Williams v. State Highway
Commission, 252 N.C. 141, 113 S.E.2d 263 (1960).
92
Gideon Kanner, Hunting the Snark, Not the Quark: Has the Supreme Court Been
Competent in Its Effort to Formulate Coherent Regulatory Takings Law?, 30 URB.
LAW 307 (1998).
93
See Robert H. Freilich, Planning Blight: The Anglo-American Experience, 29
URB. LAW. vii, xii (1997).
Freilich distinguishes between planning and
condemnation blight on the grounds that the latter is caused when “condemnation is
inevitable—as opposed to the former, where condemnation is merely a possibility.”
90
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aggrieved property owners to compensation for “de facto takings.” A
de facto taking occurs whenever the state excessively interferes with
property rights without carrying out a declared seizure by eminent
domain. The category of de facto takings is a broad one, and includes
regulatory takings, physical invasions and denial of access.94 Some
courts have extended the concept to include particularly egregious
instances of condemnation blight.95 Many cases, however, have
refused to find that a takings declaration amounts to a de facto taking,
even where the declaration itself leads to loss of property value.96
Some states utilize a second doctrine permitting the court to roll
back the date of measuring market value to the date that the
government declared its intention to confiscate the property.97 This
doctrine produces results very similar to the de facto takings
doctrine—the de facto takings doctrine moves back the date of the
recognized taking, while the valuation rollback doctrine moves back
the date of the valuation, while leaving the recognized takings date in
place. However, most states agree that the correct valuation date is
the date of the taking, leaving compensation blight uncompensated.98
The scope of the project doctrine does not focus on compensation
dates; instead, it posits that the state does not have to pay
compensation for value created by the government project prompting
the taking. Thus, if a government project raises the value of land to
be taken for it, the government may discount from the compensation
award all increases attributable to the project.99 The scope of the
project rule may also be used by property owner-compensation
94

See 2A-6 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 6.01 (2005).
See, e.g., Foster v. City of Detroit, 254 F.Supp. 655 (E.D. Mich. 1966), aff'd, 405
F.2d 138 (6th Cir. 1968).
96
See, e.g., Veillon v Lafayette, 467 So 2d 184 (La App 3d Cir 1985) (mayor’s and
project agent’s declaration to homeowners that their home will be taken in order to
facilitate transportation project does not constitute a taking).
97
Lange v. State, 547 P.2d 282 (Wash. 1976) (valuation must be at an earlier time
than the date of the trial to achieve just compensation); City of Buffalo v. J.W.
Clement Co., 28 N.Y.2d 241, 257, 321 N.Y.S.2d 345, 355, 269 N.E.2d 895, 905,
reh'g denied, 29 N.Y.2d 640, 324 N.Y.S.2d 315, 273 N.E.2d 315 (1971), appeal
dismissed, 31 N.Y.2d 958, 341 N.Y.S2d 104, 293 N.E.2d 252 (1972) (property
owner may introduce evidence of “affirmative value-depressing acts” by
government agency in order to increase valuation).
98
See 8A-18 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 18.04 (2005).
99
See, e.g. Almota Farmers Elevator & Warehouse Co. v. United States, 409 U.S.
470, 477-78 (1973) (“Government must pay just compensation [only] for those
interests ‘probably within the scope of the project from the time the Government
was committed to it.’”); United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 63 S. Ct. 276, 87 L.
Ed. 336 (1943); City of Cleveland v. Carcione, 118 Ohio App. 525, 26 Ohio Op. 2d
53, 190 N.E.2d 52, 5 A.L.R.3d 891 (1963).
95
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claimants to support the argument that the owner is entitled to
payment for the diminution of value caused by the takings
announcement. However, this is not the usual application of the rule.
Most importantly, in Monongahela Nav. Co. v. United States, the
United States Supreme Court has ruled that the constitutional
requirement of just compensation does not include payment for
condemnation blight.100
3. Bargaining, Litigation and Transaction Costs
Private
property
rights
activists
allege
that
the
undercompensation problem is further exacerbated by the
government’s superior bargaining position in its negotiations with
owners. It is often the practice of the government to try to negotiate a
voluntary transfer, prior to resorting to eminent domain. A voluntary
settlement is advantageous for the government as it saves the
government potential litigation costs as well as negative publicity.
Private property rights champions and eminent domain practitioners
caution, however, that the settlement amount offered by the
government in pre-takings negotiations is much lower than the fair
market value and owners who agree to accept it receive lower
compensation than their neighbors who refuse the offer, and seek
instead legal determination of just compensation. Various anecdotal
horror stories about government’s abuse of its bargaining power are
brought to substantiate this claim.
For example, in a recent eminent domain case from Virginia, the
local board of commissioners awarded a farmer approximately
2,000% of the initial government appraisal for his land ($2.4 million
instead of $112,000).101 Similarly, a jury awarded the owner of one
of the properties that was condemned for the construction of General
Motor’s Poletown plant in Detroit almost 1,500% of the initial
government offer ($5.1 million instead of $357,000).102 According to
another report, “[f]or years, the Minnesota Department of
Transportation has taken private land for road projects and offered the
owners substantially less than the land was worth.”103 Occasionally,
the Department of Transportation commissioned more than one
appraisal and chose to negotiate with property owners based on a low
appraisal without disclosing the existence of higher estimates.
100

Monongahela Nav. Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312 (1893).
See http://www.vafb.com/news/2005/april/042105_1.htm. The case is likely to
be appealed.
102
See http://www.ackerman-ackerman.com/case2.html.
103
Browning, supra note 14.
101
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Property owners complained that these “‘low-ball’ offers have
compelled them to spend thousands of dollars to get their own
appraisals, hire attorneys and fight for a fair price for land they didn't
even want to sell.”104 For example, one family rejected a $175,000 it
had received from the agency, hired an attorney and eventually won
an award of $420,000 but the legal battle cost $53,000 in appraisal
and attorney fees.105 Other Minnesotans whose land was condemned
complained that the “high cost of fighting forced to settle for less than
they deserve” and that even those who ultimately received fair market
value “c[a]me out behind, financially.”106 Others stories of lowballing abound. Indeed, the conventional wisdom among eminent
domain practitioners is that government will always try to get land on
the cheap.
But are these stories representative? Or more importantly, do
they really prove the existence of widespread undercompensation?
The answer is probably no. There is nothing particularly surprising
about the fact that government seeks to get land on the cheap. After
all, at least on some accounts, the government’s motivation is to pay
as little as possible. Evidence that the government often makes low
initial offers, however, does not prove that the final amount paid is
also low. The initial offer is merely the opening salvo in a long legal
battle.
The only empirical study on takings compensation depicts a
picture far more nuanced and complicated than various private
property rights activists would have us believe. In her study of
eminent domain compensation in Chicago, Patricia Munch found that
current compensation doctrine leads to both undercompensation, and
overcompensation: owners of high-value properties tend to get
overcompensated while owners of low-value lots often receive
undercompensation.107 Munch theorized that what accounts for this
result is the presence of symmetric litigation costs and the inadvertent
cross-subsidies of government legal costs.
Like private property owners, the government stands to incur
litigation costs when its attempt to secure consensual transfer fails.
However, the calculus of private property owners is dramatically
different than that of the government. Since each owner has only one
lot at stake, her decision about how much to invest in legal
representation depends directly on the value of the lot. Owners of
104

Id.
Id.
Id.
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Munch, supra note 11.
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high value lots who have a lot at stake have an incentive to hire top
legal advisors, while owners of low value lots obtain lower quality
legal representation. By contrast, the government engages in
numerous legal proceedings, and it has a permanent staff of lawyers
on standby. These lawyers are paid a steady salary, and do not
receive differential compensation based on the value of the
condemned property. Rather, the government pays an optimal
amount for its legal staff when averaged over the total expected cost
of eminent domain cases, meaning that in any individual case, the
government will probably pay too much or too little. In low value
cases, the government lawyers are probably overqualified, and the
government effectively overpays for legal representation.
Conversely, for high value cases, the government lawyers are
probably under-qualified, and the government receives inadequate
representation. Consequently, the government’s legal counsel will
likely outperform the owner’s counsel for low-value property, while
being outperformed by the lawyers of high-value property owners.
Munch found that “as a rough approximation, a $7000 parcel
receives about $5000, a $13,000 property breaks even, and a $40,000
parcel may get two or three times its market value.”108 Thus, she
characterized eminent domain as “a tax on low-valued and a subsidy
on high-valued properties.”109 This distributive result is, to say the
least, unattractive.
Although Munch’s work fails to support the belief that the
government pays sub-market prices due to a superior bargaining
position, many states have enacted legislation designed to “restore”
the balance between property owners and government. Nearly twenty
states offer some kinds of subsidy of condemnees’ litigation expenses.
Some states leave the subsidies to the court’s discretion, and some
allow only the payment of certain kinds of expenses, such as expert
witness fees.110 Others, however, require the payment of litigation
expenses where the final compensation award substantially exceeds
the government’s initial offer.111 No state specifically addresses the
distributive problems identified by Munch.
108

Id. at 488. The estimates are based on a study of land acquisitions by the
Chicago Department of Urban Renewal from 1962-1970. Id. at 485.
109
Id. at 488.
110
The laws of at least three other states – Colorado, Minnesota, and New
Hampshire – allow condemnees to recover expert fees. See Keller v. Miller, 165
P.774, 776 (Colo. 1917); MINN. STAT. § 117.175(2); NH. REV. STAT. ANN. § 498A:27, Appeal of the Ribblesdale, Inc., 513 A.2d 360 (N.H.1986).
111
16 states have enacted statutes that award full or partial reimbursement for court
costs and attorney’s fees to private property owners in eminent domain litigation.
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II. SELF-ASSESSMENTS AND COMPENSATION
Our discussion thus far has demonstrated two central points.
First, as a general rule, fairness and efficiency theories require
payment of full compensation at the property owner’s value in those
cases where compensation is warranted.112 Second, existing
compensation doctrine does not ensure property owners full
compensation. In this Part, we propose an alternative compensation
mechanism that aligns compensation practice with the demands of
efficiency and fairness. In explaining our mechanism, we will
highlight its advantages relative to existing compensation doctrine. In
addition, we will show how it may be used not only for government
declared takings but also in inverse condemnation actions, including
those asserting the existence of a regulatory taking. Finally, we will
place our proposal within the burgeoning literature on self-assessment
and information revealing valuation mechanisms.
A. An Alternative Proposal
Obviously, the payment of full compensation to owners requires
knowing the value that owners attach to their property. While the
market value component is both observable and verifiable by third
parties, the additional surplus enjoyed by the particular owner is
generally not. Hence, to compensate owners for their additional
surplus the legal system must rely on nonverifiable information
supplied by owners. Herein lies the rub. Where the owner’s
testimony serves as the basis for determining compensation awards,
Generally speaking, Alaska, Florida, Iowa, Michigan, Montana, Oregon, South
Dakota, Washington and Wisconsin mandate such award when the litigation results
in a greater award to the condemnee. See ALASKA R. CIV. PRO. 72(k)(3); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 73.092; IOWA CODE § 6B.33; MICH. COMP. LAWS § 213.66(3); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 70-30-305; ORE. REV. STAT. § 35.346(7)(a); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-3523; WASH. REV. CODE § 8.25.070(1)(b); WIS. STAT. § 32.28(3)(d). It should be
noted that most of these states require the compensation awarded by trial to be
greater than the relevant government offer by a margin of 10% to 30%. California,
Delaware, Idaho, Kansas, Louisiana, Nebraska, New York, Oklahoma, and South
Carolina give courts discretion to award court costs and attorney fees to successful
condemnees, but do not mandate such action. See CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE §§
1268.710 & 1268.720; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10 § 6111; IDAHO CODE § 7-711A(8);
KAN. STAT. § 26-509; LA. REV. STAT. §§ 19:8 & 19:109 (attorney fees only); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 76-720; N.Y. EM. DOM. PROC. LAW § 701; OKLA. STAT. tit. 27 §
11(3); S.C. CODE ANN. § 28-2-510(3). Some states in this group also require the
final award to exceed the relevant government offer by a certain margin.
112
It should be clear that the question of which acts of government mandate
compensation under the Takings Clause is a complicated one beyond the scope of
this paper.
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owners have every incentive to exaggerate.113 It is for this reason that
compensation doctrine systematically disregards those components of
surplus value that cannot be readily verified, such as subjective value.
In a word, then, takings law pays less than full compensation for
practical, rather than principled, reasons.
In a classic article, Saul Levmore pointed a way out of this
dilemma. Drawing upon the experience of an income tax system that
has relied on self-reporting for many years, Levmore noted that
sufficient penalties can curb parties’ tendency to under-report their
taxable income. He then suggested importing the same approach to
the context of property taxes by allowing owners to assess their own
property value subject to penalties designed to deter underreporting.
Specifically, to balance the tendency to underreport and reduce tax
liability, Levmore suggested that self-reported value would also serve
as the property’s sale price. In other words, if the owner of Blackacre
reported its value at $100 liability for purposes of property tax
liability, anyone could force the owner to part with Blackacre in
exchange for $100. Importantly, Levmore included the government
in the group of potential purchasers who could force a sale.
Our proposal is in many ways the obverse of Levmore’s. While
Levmore’s main goal was to ensure higher tax revenues to the
government, our goal is to guarantee full compensation to property
owners. As a result, by contrast to Levmore, the foremost challenge
we face is over (rather than under-) reporting. As we will explain
later,114 property tax law and compensation law do not treat assessed
property value identically. Consequently, the shift in focus from tax
law to eminent domain compensation has important policy
ramifications.115
In the remainder of this part, we lay out a simple mechanism that
would allow property owners to recover the full value they place on
their property in cases of eminent domain. Once the government
declares its intent to condemn a certain lot, the owner will be asked to
report the value she attaches to the property. After the owner submits
her report, the government may either seize the property at the
declared value or forego its plan to condemn that property. To use
finance terminology, under our proposal, the property owner gets to

113

Fennell, supra note 9, at 1419.
See Part III.C., infra.
In Part II.C., infra, we discuss Levmore’s proposal in greater detail and highlight
many important differences between our proposal and his.
114
115
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set the strike price for the government option to take.116 To deter
over-reporting two restrictions will be imposed on owners of
properties that the government chooses not to take. First, the owners
will not be able to transfer the property for less than the self-reported
value. Secondly, their property tax liability will be based on the selfreported valuation. However, for reasons we explain shortly, the
government will not collect the full amount paid by the owners.
The two limitations we propose warrant further explanation. The
first limitation is essentially a partial inalienability restraint. It does
not fully bar owners from transferring their property. Rather, it only
sets a price floor (at the self-assessed amount) for transfer.
Inalienability does not only apply to commercial sales but also to gifts
and more generally to all fee simple transfers, in order to avoid
fraudulent circumventions of the inalienability restriction. The partial
inalienability restraint will remain in force for seventy years,117 unless
the owner transfers the property at the self-assessed price (or higher)
in which event the restraint will expire. The owner may overcome the
inalienability restraint, however, by paying a redemption fee to the
government at the time of an otherwise-forbidden transfer. Where an
owner seeks to transfer the property for less than the self-reported
value, she may do so if she pays to the government a fee equal to the
difference between the sale price and the self-reported value.
The tax restraint is significantly more complicated. Ordinarily,
property taxes are set according to a value assessed by a government
assessor, and have no connection with other values that might be
assigned to the property by other government bodies.118 We do not
propose changing this basic fact. Only when the government
indicates its intent to seize a particular parcel will our proposal come
116

For a discussion of eminent domain as a call option see IAN AYRES, OPTIONAL
LAW 4 (2005).
117
We suggest a period of seventy years in order to approximate a lifetime of
ownership, without making the length of the partial inalienability period depend on
the actual owner’s age. We avoid an infinite partial inalienability period out of
respect for property law’s general (and justified) dislike of absolute restraints on
alienability. See, e.g., JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 54 (5th ed.
2002). Additionally, we note that due to the effects of discounting future value, a
seventy-year restraint will not be significantly less costly to owners than an infinite
restraint. We discuss the particular problems raised by elderly owners infra, in Part
III.A.
118
See e.g., Clifford H. Goodall & Seth A. Goodall, Property Tax: A Primer and a
Modest Proposal for Maine, 57 ME. L. REV. 585, 597 (2005) (noting that “[m]odern
property tax limits use a variety of techniques, including direct limits on revenue
growth, levy limits, and property tax caps that indirectly limit tax revenue growth,
as well as limiting growth rates for assessed values). .
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into play. Once the property owner has submitted her reported value
for purposes of eminent domain, the property tax assessor will have to
keep track of two values – the government-assessed value and the
surplus, i.e., the amount by which the self-reported value exceeds the
government-assessed value. The government-assessed value will
continue to serve as the basis of the regular property tax bill.
However, there will be an additional property tax assessed on the
surplus. This additional property tax will not be paid to the
government; instead, the property owner will be free to donate it to a
charity of her choice.
This can be implemented by simple
mechanisms such as a check-off box in the property tax bill.119 Like
the inalienability restraint, the surplus tax liability should end once the
property is transferred.
The rate at which the surplus will be taxed can best be explained
in two stages. Consider first the possibility of taxing the surplus at its
nominal value, at the same rate as the government-assessed value.
For example, consider a property with a government-assessed value
of $200,000, market value of $250,000, and self-reported value of
$300,000. Additionally, assume that the property tax rate is 1% of
assessed value. Under this option, the owner would have to pay a tax
of $2,000 (1% of the government assessed value of $200,000) to the
government, and an additional tax of $1,000 (1% of the surplus of
$100,000) to a charity of the owner’s choice.
We suggest, however, taxing the surplus at an assessmentadjusted rate, rather than at nominal value. Specifically, rather than
pay tax on the full amount of the surplus, the owner should pay tax
only on the difference between self-reported value and market value,
further discounted to reflect the ratio between assessed and market
value. This can best be understood by returning to the previous
example. As noted above, the nominal value of the surplus is
$100,000 (self-reported value minus government-assessed value), and
the tax due would therefore be $1,000 under a nominal surplus tax.
However, under our proposal, the taxable amount is based only on the
discounted value of the owner premium. Specifically, we first
calculate the amount by which the self-reported value exceeds market
value — here, $50,000. Next, we calculate the ratio at which
government-assessed value is discounted relative to market value —
here, the assessed value is 80% of the market value. Finally, the
owner premium is discounted by the same amount, in order to arrive
at the taxable surplus — here, 80% x $50,000 = $40,000. Thus, under
119

Our model is the check-off box for presidential election financing on federal tax
forms.
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the second option, the taxpayer would pay a total property tax bill of
$2,400. The first $2,000 represents 1% of the government-assessed
value of $200,000 and must be paid to the government. The other
$400 represents 1% of the taxable surplus of $40,000, and must be
paid to a charity of the owner’s choice.
Importantly, the market price used here for calculating the
discount is not the market price of the specific property. Rather, the
discount is calculated by comparing market prices (determined by
sales of similar sized properties) to assessed values throughout the
neighborhood. Thus, there is no need to engage in complicated
assessments of market price of any individual property. Instead,
readily available data can be converted into an average ratio,
providing the base for determining the tax discount.
To illustrate how the two restrictions operate, we return to the
example of the Introduction, modifying the numbers to accord with
the previous example. The city of Chicago has declared its desire to
use its power of eminent domain to seize realty owned by Joni Olin
for the purpose of building a public university. The Cook County
Assessor’s office has assessed the value of Blackacre at $200,000 for
the purpose of property tax rolls, and the actual market value of the
property is $250,000. Ms. Olin values Blackacre at $300,000, and she
so reports. If the city takes the property, it will have to pay Ms. Olin
the full $300,000. If not, Ms. Olin will retain the property subject to
the inalienability and property tax restraints. She will only be able to
sell Blackacre for less than $300,000 if she pays the City of Chicago
the difference between this amount and the eventual sale price.
Second, Ms. Olin will receive a tax bill adjusted for her self-assessed
value of $300,000 rather than the former tax roll assessment of
$200,000. Ms. Olin’s taxable property value will be $240,000, and
five-sixths of her tax bill will be paid to the municipality, and the
other sixth to Ms. Olin’s charity of choice – naturally, the Federalist
Society.
If Ms. Olin sells Blackacre to Frieda Ford for $210,000 two years
later, Ms. Olin will have to pay $90,000 to the city of Chicago as a
redemption fee. This transfer will end both the inalienability and tax
restraints.
Both the inalienability and tax restraints will require adjustments
in order to remain viable over the course of time. They must be
updated yearly for the effects of inflation and fluctuations in the real
estate market. We suggest that this could best be accomplished by
looking to a local housing price index.
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Finally, we should note that while our proposal has been based
upon a traditional exercise of eminent domain over land, it can be
used in other contexts as well. Self-assessment may be used, for
example, for determining compensation for state actions deemed
regulatory takings. Specifically, where an owner successfully
challenges a government action under an inverse taking suit, the court
can consider ordering a self-assessment for determining the amount of
compensation to be paid in the event that the government elects to
carry out the deemed regulatory taking. The self-assessment would
be subject to all the rules outlined here in order to ensure its accuracy
as a basis for compensation. Unfortunately, however, it is not
possible to extend our self-assessment proposal to takings of personal
property unless the property is subject to periodic taxes based upon
the property’s value.
B. Assessing Self-Assessment
Our proposed mechanism represents an improvement over
existing takings compensation doctrine in two important ways. First,
it ensures the payment of full compensation to condemnees, and
hence brings compensation practice into closer alignment with the
demands of efficiency and fairness. Second, it represents a reduction
in transaction costs relative to the existing regime. The current
regime relies on expensive judicial determination of compensation
awards when private negotiations break down. We submit that the
administrative process entailed in self-reporting will often arrive at a
compensation figure at a lower cost than litigation.
In this Section, we will discuss the incentive structure created by
our proposal and delineate its limitations. It is important to note at the
outset that while our model does not yield a first best result—
compensation at precisely the owner’s reserve price120—it brings us
much closer to accurate compensation at a reasonable administrative
cost.121 Due to the lack of a mechanism that precisely matches the
penalties on over-reporting with its rewards, it is very difficult to
design
a
legal
apparatus
that
eliminates
altogether
undercompensation, on the one hand, and the blocking of efficient
takings, on the other.
120

This is a first best result if not inclusive of excessive development. See supra
Part I.B.
121
Cf. Robert Innes, Takings, Compensation, and Equal Treatment for Owners of
Developed and Undeveloped Property, 40 J.L. & ECON. 403 (1997) (arguing that
first-best results can be reached only by paying compensation equal to the value of
the property to the taking authority).
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To understand the incentive structure generated by our proposal,
it is helpful to start with a simpler scenario: takings compensation on
the basis of self-reported values without penalties. In this case, the
possibility of an inefficient taking is eliminated, because the owner
has no reason to report a value of less than her reserve price. Rather,
the property owner’s self-report will be based on her best estimation
of the value of her lot to the government, so long as it is greater than
the reserve price.122 Because claiming too much runs the risk of
forgoing a profit, owners will likely report an amount lower than their
actual estimation of the value of the lot for the government.
In the case of land assembly, matters become more complicated.
Here, owners will have to take account of two additional factors: the
value of the entire project to the government, and the likely behavior
of other owners. In order to extract the marginal value of the property
to the government, owners will base their self-reporting on the total
surplus of the project to the government, adjusted to the likely reports
of other owners. In other words, property owners will attempt to
maximize their personal payoff subject to the limitation that all
reports must not exceed the total value of the project to the
government.123 This process is prone to errors and has no stable
equilibrium solution, leading to the well-known holdout problem that
justifies eminent domain.124
The real barrier to efficient outcomes in such a self-reporting
scheme is that the parties may make mistakes on account of
information and incentive constraints.
While the self-report
eliminates the possibility that the government will seize a property
whose reserve price exceeds the true value to the government, the
owner may falsely report a reserve price that exceeds the estimated
value to the government. Thus, self-reporting without penalties
ensures that no inefficient takings will proceed; however, it does not
guarantee that efficient takings will go forward.
Our proposal addresses this problems by, on the one hand, tying
compensation to the reserve price of the owner (at least, as reported
by the owner), and, on the other hand, penalizing the owner for overreporting. The result is that the barrier to efficient takings is greatly
122

While this might have undesirable distributive effects, it will lead to the optimal
number of takings. See, id.
123
This is due to the fact that if the total self-reported amount exceed the
government’s expected value, the government will forgo the project.
124
See generally, RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 62 (5th ed.
1998) (justifying eminent domain as a mechanism for overcoming holdouts);
STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 124 (2004)
(same).

SSRN WORKING PAPER

© 2005, Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky

BARGAINING FOR TAKINGS COMPENSATION

9/16/2005 2:09 PM

35

reduced, while the chance of inefficient takings is lowered
significantly.
To begin with, we consider the effect of our proposed penalties
on over-reporting values. How does the addition of our two restraints
change the reporting incentives of the owners? Self-reporting
potentially imposes two additional costs—a higher tax burden, and a
partial inalienability restraint which makes property less liquid. The
inalienability restraint will never induce owners to report a price
lower than their reserve price, for reasons we will explain shortly.
However, it will not completely eliminate the possibility that owners
will report a price greater than reserve price (and, accidentally, in
excess of government value) and thereby block efficient takings. The
tax restraint produces a blanket incentive to report smaller values.
Notably, this effect on incentives applies even if the reported price is
lower than the reserve price. At any reported value greater than the
market price, even where less than the reserve price, the owner will
face a higher property tax bill. However, the discounting of the
surplus tax significantly reduces the power of this incentive. The
result, we submit, is that owners will be driven to reporting values
close to their reserve prices.
We now turn to a more precise examination of the incentive
structure created by our proposed penalties. As we have seen, in the
absence of penalties, all reporting is strategic, and is designed to
capture as much of the government surplus as possible. However, the
inalienability restraint places a cost on excess reporting by reducing
the ability of the owner to enjoy the full subjective value.
Specifically, owners will not be able to translate the subjective value
into other assets, unless they sell the property at the reported price.
For any lower price, owners will lose part of the value they attach to
their property. The inalienability restraint is not important at reported
prices lower than the reserve price. After all, owners would not sell
their property for less than the reserve price in any event.
The inalienability restraint, on its own, does not provide a
sufficient check on owner’s predisposition to over-report. First, it is
important to realize that not all owners wish to transfer title to their
property in the foreseeable future. Owners derive value from their
properties in ways other than transfer, for example, through self-use
or leasing. Moreover, many owners have no realistic expectation of
receiving an offer that would exceed their reserve price and
consequently have no expectation of parting with their property. Such
owners derive value from their property through possession and use.
Second, even for owners who consider transfer, the partial
inalienability restraint does not impose a penalty on exaggeration
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commensurate with the benefit. The benchmark for the gain from
exaggeration is still the value the government places on the project,
whereas the cost is represented by the expected loss in the case of a
future sale. Since the two measures—the government value and the
future sale price—bear no necessary relationship to one another, there
will be cases where owners will expect to gain much more from
exaggerated self-reports than they will lose.
The tax restraint depresses the incentive to self-report prices
above market price, and thereby further reduces the incentive to
exaggerate. Because the tax burden is discounted, the tax restraint
only takes effect when self-reported values are higher than market
price. For any increment above market price, the owner should
expect to pay the penalty of increased taxes if the government forgoes
carries out the taking. Because the tax liability is affected not only by
the above-market premium reported, but also by the probability of
taking, owners will be particularly careful not to exceed the
government’s expected value. Naturally, however, owners are
unlikely to have very good information about the likelihood of taking
and the government’s value.
Unfortunately, the tax restraint does not bear any direct
relationship to the owner’s reserve price. For a self-reported price
above reserve price, an owner will have to compare the expected
gains of taking compensation above reserve (discounted by the
possibility that a taking will not take place) with the expected cost of
a tax liability for above-market value (discounted by the possibility
that a taking will take place). For a self-reported price below reserve,
the owner will have to compare two kinds of costs: the expected cost
of subjective value not covered by taking compensation (discounted
by the possibility that a taking will not take place) and the expected
cost of a tax liability for above-market value (discounted by the
possibility that a taking will take place). In either case, the owner’s
reported value will be based upon estimations of government value
and the likelihood of taking, rather than reserve price.
Nevertheless, the tax restraint does leave room for reporting
values above market price (allowing recapture of some subjective
value). And because its effects are discounted, it does not create
excessive pressure to report low values.
Together, the inalienability and tax restraints create an imperfect
but definite incentive to report values close to the reserve price.
There is no incentive whatsoever to report values lower than the
market price. For supra-market, sub-reserve prices, only the tax
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restraint is important. Finally, for supra-reserve prices, both the tax
and inalienability restraints play a role in curbing exaggerations.
Our analysis is summarized in the following table:
Table I: Efficiency of Eminent Domain Under Different
Compensation Regimes
Current Policy

Type I:
Inefficient
Project
Implemented

If reserve price >
government value
> market price

Type II:
Efficient
Project Not
Implemented

Only if court
exaggerates
compensation
value or high
administrative
costs

SelfReporting
without
Penalty
Will not
happen

If reported
price >
government
value >
reserve price

Self-Reporting
with Penalties
If reserve price >
government value >
reported price
(RARE – depends
on gap between
reserve price and
assessed price,
property tax rates)
If reported price >
government value >
reserve price
(RARE – depends
on owner
information
concerning
government price)

Per our earlier discussion, eminent domain may give rise to two
types of inefficiencies. First, when owners are undercompensated,
exercises of eminent domain may lead to the implementation of
inefficient projects. We refer to this possibility as Type I inefficiency.
Second, when owners are overcompensated, the need to pay excess
compensation may lead the government to cancel efficient
development project.
We refer to this problem at Type II
inefficiency.
Because current compensation regime does not compensate
owners for the full value they attach to their properties, it may
generate a relatively high number of Type I inefficiencies. In
addition, the current compensation regime may also generate Type II
inefficiencies—i.e., prevent efficient projects from moving forward—
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where, due to judicial error about market value, courts require
compensation about the reserve price of condemnees
(overcompensation) or where the administrative cost of meting out
compensation is prohibitively high.
Self-reporting without penalties eliminates the problem of Type I
inefficiencies. Under this regime, owners get to set their own price
and will naturally refuse to sell for less than the value they place on
their property. However, self-reporting without penalties may lead to
a high number of incidents of Type II inefficiencies. Owners may
exaggerate in their estimation of the government value, and block
execution of the project altogether.
Self-reporting with penalties reintroduces a small number of Type
I inefficiencies, while dramatically reducing Type II inefficiencies.
Because the potential increase in property tax liability due to the gap
between reported value and government assessed value is relatively
low, owners will rarely report a value under their reserve price, and
thereby risk loss of a portion of subjective value. Conversely, owners
will rarely overshoot government value, since the price of
exaggerated reports of property value includes an alienability
restriction as well as greater tax liabilities.
Finally, we should note the importance of the diversion of surplus
tax revenues to a charity of the owner’s choice, rather than the
government itself. The introduction of heightened tax liability might
spur the government to abuse its eminent domain power to boost the
tax base. If the government were to collect the full tax amount paid
by owners, it would have an incentive to declare eminent domain
projects, without really intending to execute them, in order to extract
higher property taxes from all the supposedly affected owners. To
safeguard against such strategic abuse by the government, we propose
that the incremental rise in tax revenues be diverted to another source.
C. The Self-Assessment Literature
Recently, scholarly interest in self-assessment has grown;125 our
proposal is consistent with this trend. The legal literature on selfassessment may be traced back to Levmore’s seminal piece on
property taxes,126 which we have already discussed at some length127
and will continue to analyze here. Inspired by Levmore, in a previous
125

See, e.g., Fennel, supra note 9; Levmore, supra note 24, Bell & Parchomovsky,
Takings Reassessed, supra note 25.
126
Levmore, supra note 24.
127
See, supra Part II.A.
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essay, we proposed a self-assessment mechanism to account for the
effect of derivative takings — government acts that do not amount to
physical or regulatory takings on property values.128 Most recently,
Lee Anne Fennell made an important contribution to the selfassessment literature by proposing self-assessment mechanisms for
establishing the value of environmental and zoning amenities.129 To
date, eminent domain compensation has eluded systematic analysis in
the self-assessment framework, and while Levmore’s article briefly
looks at eminent domain, he arrives at it from a different direction,
treating the matter as an extension of a basic tax-oriented theory.130
Indeed, in her article, Lee Anne Fennell lists eminent domain as an
example of a paradigmatic self-assessment case that has not yet been
resolved.131
What is the draw of self-assessment and why is it growing?
Disclosure of information through the legal system may often be
costly and the outcome of the process may be highly inaccurate.132
This is especially true in cases where one of the parties is in
possession of nonobservable and nonverifiable information from
which she can derive great benefit. Since judicial and administrative
processes are both expensive and error-prone,133 the modern trend in
legal scholarship is to look for private and quasi-private mechanisms
for resolving certain kinds of market failures. 134 Thus, for example,
128

Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 25.
Fennell, supra note 9.
Levmore, supra note 24, at 789-90.
131
Fennell, supra note 9, at 1419-20 (using eminent domain as an example where
“name your own award” and standard bargaining fail)..
132
See e.g., Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal
Entitlement To Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027, 1030 (1995)
(pointing out that "self-interested bargainers have a strong incentive to misrepresent
their private valuations so as to capture a larger share of the bargaining 'pie"');
Richard R.W. Brooks, The Relative Burden of Determining Property Rules and
Liability Rules: Broken Elevators in the Cathedral, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 267, 281
(2002) (discussing how parties' strategic incentives may impede a judge's ability to
assess valuations accurately); Joseph Farrell, Information and the Coase Theorem, 1
J. ECON. PERSP. 113, 117 (1987) (explaining that private valuations typically induce
actors to lie, "[u]nless everyone shares the same goals,").
133
See e.g., James E. Krier & Stewart J. Schwab, Property Rules and Liability
Rules: The Cathedral in Another Light, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 440, 452 (1995) (arguing
that it will be costly and difficult for courts to assess damages accurately precisely
in those situations that private bargaining fails); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell,
Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis, 109 HARV. L. REV.
713, 750-751 (1996) (contending that injunctions poses an even greater assessment
challenge for courts).
134
For an elaborate discussion of possible legal solutions to the problem of private
information, see, AYRES, supra note 116.
129
130
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Fennell focuses on the difficulties faced by courts in evaluating
environmental and zoning amenities.135
In the remainder of this subsection, we will highlight the
differences between our self-assessment mechanism and other similar
mechanisms, especially that of Levmore. Both Levmore and Fennell
focus on what Fennell dubbed “Entitlement Subject to Self-Made
Options” (ESSMO).136
This options mechanism requires the
entitlement holder to create a call or put option on her entitlement,
and thereby subject herself to a forced sale at the predetermined strike
price.137 For example, in discussing the problem of yard art in the
context of common interest community, Fennell suggested that each
unit owner who displays art works in her yard would be required to
set a price at which the community could remove the art work from
In the same vein, to introduce flexibility into
the yard.138
conservation easements arrangements, Fennell suggested that the
easement holder (the government or a qualifying non governmental
organization) would set a “running call option” on the easement,
allowing future owners of the relevant tract to “reclaim” the
easement.139 Likewise, Levmore’s proposed a property tax system
that would require owners to self-assess the value of their properties
while allowing others to acquire the property at the reported
valuation.140
Both Fennel’s and Levmore’s projects are far more ambitious
than ours; both seek not a solution to the local problem of inadequate
compensation, but, rather, to change the very nature of entitlements in
our legal system. They seek to impose on all entitlement holders the
duty to create new options exercisable by third parties.141 We limit
our suggestions to the realm of eminent domain. Thus, we seek to
intervene in a case where the government already has a call option on
all property exercisable at the government’s will as long as the
exercise is for a public use. For this reason, we anticipate that our
135

Fennell, supra note 9, at 1444-87.
Fennell, supra note 9, at 1406.
Id., at 1407-08.
138
Id., at 1446-50.
139
Id., at 1446-50.
140
Levmore, supra note 24, at 779 (“[i]n short, the system uses forced sales, in lieu
of audits and fines, as a way of encouraging accurate self-assessment “).
141
Fennell, supra note 9, at 1407 (“[an ESSMO] works by requiring a party to
package her true subjective valuation in the form of an option—in other words, she
must formulate a ‘revealing option.’”); Levmore, supra note 24, at 779 (requiring
property owner to state a price at which third parties may force them to sell their
properties).
136
137
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proposal may be adopted even by those opposed to revolutionary
change in the legal approach to entitlements.
A second difference is that Fennel and Levmore seek to achieve
accurate self-assessment by blurring the roles of buyer and seller.
Their mechanisms attempt to put the entitlement holder in a position
where she does not know whether she is buying or selling the relevant
entitlement.142 The better the mechanism “veils” the role of the
entitlement holder, the more effective it is in inducing truthful
reporting. Moreover, both Fennel and Levmore assign the function of
securing honest self-reporting by entitlement owners to the market or
a segment thereof. The sanction both scholars employ to deter
inaccurate reporting is forced acquisitions by private actors.143
Eminent domain is not amenable to a similar mechanism. In the
context of eminent domain, the government is always the “buyer.”144
Our legal system grants the government a call option over private
property,145 and we do not seek to add to this a general put option in
property owners that would empower them to sell their property to the
government under normal circumstances. Nor do we wish to expand
the number of parties that may exercise a call option over the
property. Hence, we are forced to use a different mechanism design
to induce truthful self-assessment. Instead of using forced sales, we
employ a partial inalienability and tax constraints to deter owners
from exaggerating.
Since Levmore noted that his mechanism may also be used in the
takings context, we would like to further elaborate on the differences
between his apparatus and ours. First, because Levmore's main focus
is self assessment of value for tax purposes,146 his scheme is designed
primarily to overcome is under-evaluation. We, by contrast, focus on
eminent domain and hence the main challenge for us is overvaluation. Indeed, we specifically employ a decoupling mechanism
intended to block use of self-assesment to raise property tax revenues.
142

See e.g., Ayres & Talley, supra note 132, at 1030 (“[D]ivided entitlements can
facilitate trade by inducing claim holders to reveal more information than they
would under an undivided entitlement regime. Owners of divided, or ‘Solomonic’
entitlements must bargain more forthrightly than owners of undivided entitlements,
because the entitlement division obscures the titular boundary between ‘buyer’ and
‘seller.’”).
143
Fennell, supra note 9, at 1407-09; Levmore, supra note 24, at 779-80.
144
Cf. Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Pliability Rules, 101 MICH. L. REV.
1, 59-64 (2002) (discussing eminent domain).
145
See AYRES, supra note 116, at 4. Cf. Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 144.
146
Levmore, supra note 24, at 778-791 (discussing self-assessment in the context of
property tax).
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Second, and relatedly, the scope of Levmore’s project and remedies is
vastly different than ours. Levmore would apply his self-assessment
mechanism to all property owners, and would allow private takings
(forced purchases by other private parties).147 Our mechanism
requires self-assessments only from property owners whose property
is subject to condemnation, and allows takings only by the
government. Third, and finally, because of our different goals, we use
two mechanisms to keep property owners honest: increased tax
liability and partial inalienability.
Levmore uses a different
mechanism altogether: the threat of forced purchases by third
parties.148 Note that the real big difference here is that Levmore's goal
is our means, and one of our means is his ultimate goal (increased tax
revenues (at a lower cost, of course). As a result, Levmore has
neither need nor use for the partial inalienability.
III.

EXTENSIONS AND POTENTIAL OBJECTIONS

In this Part, we elaborate on some of the implications of our selfassessment proposal and address potential objections. Specifically,
we focus on the challenges posed by using inalienability and property
tax valuations to induce accurate reporting in the context of eminent
domain, and the cases in which self-assessed prices may prevent the
government from realizing its plans.
A. Corner Cases
We begin by examining potential problems with our inalienability
restraint.
As we noted, the restriction deters owners from
overreporting their subjective value lest they be prevented from
transferring the property at anything less than an exaggerated price.149
We also noted that the effectiveness of this restraint would depend on
the owners’ anticipation of a sale or other transfer during the coming
seventy years.150 However, there are a number of cases in which the
owner might have no realistic expectation of sale during her life, such
as where the owner is elderly, rendering the inalienability restraint
less effective.
147

Id.
Id., at 779 (“[p]eriodically--perhaps every other year in staggered fashion around
a locale--the self-assessed amounts are publicized and any buyer who is willing to
pay that amount to the owner/self-assessor is entitled to the property).
149
See, supra Part II.A.
150
See, supra Part II.A.
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In many cases, elderly owners will expect to transfer title only
upon their death, through bequest or inheritance. While the partial
inalienability restraint will apply to the property in the hands of the
heirs or devisees, elderly owners may discount the effects of this
restraint as it does not apply directly to them. The result is that the
value of the expected sanction imposed by the inalienability restraint
will be lower. Hence, such owners may have a greater motivation to
overstate their self-assessment price.
While we recognize that elderly owners pose a challenge for our
scheme, this challenge should not be overstated. First, the difference
between elderly owners and other owners is merely a difference in
degree, not in kind. Hence, our scheme should also work in the case
of elderly owners. It must be borne in mind that the property tax
restraint will apply to elderly owners who fail to sell at their selfassessed price. The increased tax liability will naturally curb the
incentive of elderly owners to overstate the value they attach to their
properties.
Second, while folk wisdom suggests that elderly owners are
likely to hold out against efficient development, this perception may
be more of a myth than reality. On average, the cost of eminent
domain for elderly owners is higher than it is for other owners. This
is because the cost of transition is especially high for elderly owners,
meaning the elderly owners likely face higher transaction costs in
replacing property. Consequently, compensation at market value, as
is the case under current doctrine, disproportionately
undercompensates elderly owners, leaving elderly owners with a
higher incentive for opposing all projects requiring them to surrender
property for market price.
Our proposal, by contrast, guarantees elderly owners full
compensation at their subjective value in the event of a taking. In
other words, our mechanism alleviates the special plight of elderly
owners, and eliminates their motivation to hold out. Hence, it is
impossible to predict the behavior of elderly owners under our
proposal based on their actions under the existing system.
A different type of owners that seem to pose a challenge for our
proposal is corporate owners. Corporate owners do not attach
emotional value to their properties and thus, one might argue that
corporations should be compensated at market value when their
properties are taken. This argument misses the mark. While it may
be true that corporations have no sentiments, this does not mean that
corporations realize only market value from the property they own.
Indeed, the large amounts of goodwill found in corporate balance
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sheets demonstrate that corporations often enjoy value beyond the
market value of their assets. It is possible that a corporation’s
goodwill grows out of its business operations, not from the unique
value it derives from its assets, in which case the taking of an asset
will not diminish the corporation’s goodwill.
Yet, even if
corporations derive only market value from their assets, this would
not undermine our self-assessment scheme. Given the incentive
structure of our self-assessment proposal, we predict that our scheme
would reduce litigation and administrative costs, making it a superior
way of carrying out takings compensation even at market value.
B. What’s Left of Eminent Domain
A broader objection would claim that our proposal essentially
eliminates eminent domain. The essence of eminent domain is the
ability to force an owner to part with title of an asset, substituting the
owner’s property rule protection for a liability rule protection.151 We
openly admit that our proposal transforms the nature of eminent
domain, restoring in the owner many of the traditional benefits of
property rule protection. Does this change do away with all the
benefits of eminent domain? The power of eminent domain is
necessary to enable the state to provide public goods. Standard
economic theory maintains that without eminent domain, the state
will not be able to procure the assets necessary for the provision of
public goods on account of information asymmetries and strategic
holdouts.152 Eminent domain allows the government to sidestep these
strategic difficulties by temporarily altering the nature of the owner’s
protection to that of a liability rule, thereby empowering the state to
force a sale.153
Although we do away with the power of the state to force a sale
at market price, we do not divest the state of its coercive powers.
While the state can no longer force a sale at market value, owners
only have the ability to name their own price, not to issue a blanket
refusal to sell. Moreover, the introduction of the tax and inalienability
restraints provides owners with a powerful incentive to report
accurately the subjective value they attach to their property. Granted,
the power we give to owners to set the price of their properties may in
some cases result in a government decision to forego a taking at the
self-assessed price. But this should only worry us if the self-assessed
151

See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra, note 144; Fennell, supra note 9; Merrill, supra
note 1.
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See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 124, at 62.
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Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 144.
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price is exaggerated. So long as the self-assessed price reflects the
subjective value to the owner, we do not want the state to take the
property unless its value exceeds the self-assessed price; otherwise,
the planned taking is inefficient.
We acknowledge that ours is not a first-best solution.
Consequently, under our proposal, owners will, in some cases,
exaggerate in their self-assessments. Depending on the magnitude of
the exaggeration and the government surplus, exaggerated reports
may in some cases thwart efficient development projects. While the
inalienability and tax restraints should reduce the magnitude of this
efficiency loss, they will not eliminate it completely. However, this
inefficiency does not signal the failure of our proposal. Current
compensation doctrine is also susceptible to efficiency losses such as
where courts set compensation too low, and the government proceeds
with inefficient projects. While we lack empirical data to demonstrate
the relative sizes of these inefficiencies, we suspect that efficiency
losses are greater under the current system than they would be under
our proposed alternative.
A case of particular concern for us is that of irrational owners of
unique assets. While an irrational owner is of little importance when
the asset at issue has ready substitutes and is traded in a functioning
market, the irrational owner of a unique good without substitutes
presents a nettlesome problem. In such cases, the irrational owner
may as well name a price that is outrageously high, placing an
inefficient (and irrational) block on a worthy project. This concern
may be especially acute in times of national emergency.
To alleviate this concern, an additional safety valve may be added
to our proposal. In instances of declared national emergency, the
government could be granted the power to petition a court to override
the self-assessed valuation and substitute a court determination of the
owner’s subjective value. For example, this special procedure may be
invoked in war time in order to seize a precious mineral necessary for
the production of weaponry after the owner dramatically overassessed the price of the asset.
This procedure may also be employed in other cases involving
irrational owners, such as holdouts in large land assembly cases. For
example, in land assembly cases involving more than twenty parcels,
the government could be permitted to seek a court assessment of the
value of holdout parcels if the government obtains 95% of the
targeted parcels through voluntary sales or by compensation at the
self-assessed price.
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C. The Mismatch Between Takings Compensation and Property
Tax Assessments
As we noted earlier the main barrier for achieving first best
solution (precise assessment at the subjective value) is the lack of
functionally opposite counterpart to takings compensation. A truly
accurate self-assessment requires that the reported price would serve
as both a buying and a selling price.154 For takings, the self-assessed
value serves only as a benchmark for the owner’s selling price. While
property tax assessments take the place of a buying price in our
proposal, the match is imperfect. As we noted, property tax
assessments are not based upon a property’s “true” value, or even its
market value. Rather, property tax assessments are determined
through a complex formula that incorporates elements such as last
sale price, historic value and location.155 Only rarely do tax appraisals
approximate the true value for the owner.
The mismatch between the two opens up the possibility of
strategic misuse of our mechanism by the government. Our proposal
enhances the ability of the government to collect property taxes, by
changing the property tax base from the traditional assessment
formulation to traditional assessment plus some percentage of
subjective value. We combat the government’s incentive to misuse
takings declarations by diverting the additional increment of property
taxes to a charitable organization of the owner’s choice. While doing
this dramatically reduces the government’s ability to abuse our
mechanism, it does not completely eliminate the potential for abuse.
The government may declare its intent to take properties simply in
order to raise revenues to charitable organizations.
While the concern about strategic misuse of takings declarations
is a real one, we do not believe it is a crucial one. We entrust the
choice of charities to the affected owner. Given the wide range of
charities, it is hard to see how the government can use our mechanism
to target donations to charities on an ideological basis. Since the
government has no way of knowing how the additional property taxes
will affect optional charitable giving, it cannot even know if, as a
whole, charities will enjoy greater donations. Even if the government
could be certain of greater charitable revenues, the activities of
charities are so diverse that the government could not reliably plan on
reducing any line-item in the budget. Hence, it is quite far-fetched to
154

See Fennell, supra note 9, at 1432 (“uncertainty over whether one will end up
buying or selling fungible portions of an entitlement helps to keep valuations of that
entitlement honest”).
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believe that the government would rely on our mechanism as a means
for funding charitable activities.
CONCLUSION
Eminent domain is one of the most extreme weapons in the
government’s arsenal of powers that affect private citizenry.
Therefore, it is not surprising that eminent domain has been at the
center of many heated debates in the legal academy and outside of
it.156 Dissatisfaction with compensation practices has even led, of
late, legal scholars and economists to question the need for this
controversial power. For example, in explaining why he believes
eminent domain to be undesirable in this day and age,157 Nobel

156

Daniel Farber issued one of the milder summaries of the state of takings law:
“there is no consensus today about takings law--only a general belief that the
takings problem is difficult and that takings doctrine is a mess.” Daniel Farber,
Public Choice and Just Compensation, 9 CONST. COMMENT. 279 (1992). Jed
Rubinfeld was less charitable, opining that “[t]hroughout constitutional
jurisprudence, only the right of privacy can compete seriously with takings law for
the doctrine-in-most-desperate-need-of-a-principle prize.” Jed Rubenfeld, Usings,
102 YALE L.J. 1077, 1081 (1993). There is no shortage of critics of the
jurisprudence of takings. See Gideon Kanner, Hunting the Snark, Not the Quark:
Has the Supreme Court Been Competent in Its Effort to Formulate Coherent
Regulatory Takings Law?, 30 URB. LAW. 302, 308 (1998) (“The incoherence of the
U.S. Supreme Court's output in this field has by now been demonstrated time and
again by practitioners and academic commentators ad nauseam, and I refuse to add
to the ongoing gratuitous slaughter of trees for the paper consumed in this
frustrating and increasingly pointless enterprise.”).
157
Becker believes that through time the costs of the eminent domain power have
eclipsed the benefits:
In the 18th, 19th, and early 20th centuries, governments did rather little, so
there was not much to fear from great abuse of the eminent domain
constitutional clause. In fact, the first real eminent domain case was not
decided until 1876. Now, however, government at all levels do so much
that the temptation is irresistible to use eminent domain condemnation
proceedings to hasten and cheapen their accumulation of property for
various projects, regardless of a projects merits.
… [U]sually a road can take competing paths, a power plant can be built in
different locations, and so forth, so that buyers, government or private, can
use the leverage from competition among sites to reduce the advantage of
holding out. And sometimes they can build around stubborn holdouts, as
happened when the property to build the privately accumulated Rockefeller
Center was put together… I am not claiming that a system without eminent
domain would work perfectly—it would not. But modern governments
have more than enough power through the power to tax and regulate.
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laureate Gary Becker wrote, “[t]o me, the only reasonable
interpretation of "fair compensation" is the worth of property to the
present owners.158
Becker is not alone. There is little doubt that the current
compensation practice, which many perceive as neither fair nor
efficient is major contributor to the general dissatisfaction with
eminent domain and the calls for its abolition. It is quite likely,
therefore, that if property owners received full compensation for the
loss occasioned on them by eminent domain exercises, the public
sentiment toward eminent domain would have been more favorable.
In this Article, we developed a mechanism that allows
policymakers to achieve this goal. Our self-assessment proposal, by
allowing property owners to name their compensation award, yields a
fairer and more efficient eminent domain regime. Even the sharpest
opponents of eminent domain recognize that “[e]liminating the
eminent domain clause from the Constitution is obviously not feasible
in any foreseeable time frame.”159 In light of this fact, it becomes all
the more important to ensure that affected property owners receive
full compensation for their losses.

Posting of Gary Becker to The Becker-Posner Blog, On Eminent Domain,
http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/archives/2005/06/index.html (June 27, 2005,
7:35 EDT).
158
Id. (emphasis added).
159
Id.

